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Abstract
Using the distinctions among the convexity, magniﬁcation, and translation effects, we
identify the pertinent parameters and examine empirically the relation between cash
holdings and option‐based managerial compensation. We show that changes in delta
reduce the effects of magniﬁcation and convexity on managerial risk aversion. We also
provide evidence that there is a negative relation between the option‐based incentives
delta and vega and cash holdings. These results are robust when incentives are extended
to include all executive boardmembers andwhen the sample is broken down according to
different risk characteristics.
JEL Classification: F30, F32, G32, G33
I. Introduction
The growing interest in executive compensation and agency problems has spawned a
large and increasing literature that looks at the option‐based incentives embedded in
managerial compensation and examines their effect on corporate ﬁnancial decisions. This
literature is motivated by the assumption that the convex compensation schedule of an
option can offset the concavity of the utility function of an underdiversiﬁed and overly
risk averse manager and make him or her less risk averse (see, e.g., Haugen and
Senbet 1981; Smith and Watts 1982; Smith and Stulz 1985; DeFusco, Johnson, and
Zorn 1990; Billett, Mauer, and Zhang 2010). Ross (2004, p. 207), however, shows that
“without further conditions on utility functions beyond monotonicity and risk aversion,
this is not correct” and that, in fact, the opposite can be true. He shows that when
examining the relation between option‐based incentives and corporate decision making
three distinct effects should be considered. The ﬁrst, called the convexity effect, is how the
individual option‐based incentives affect managerial risk aversion at a given level of
wealth. The second, called the magniﬁcation effect, reﬂects how different levels of
exposure to the ﬁrm’s share price affect managerial risk aversion. The third, called the
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translation effect, is how different levels of wealth affect managerial risk aversion. Failure
to make these distinctions in empirical applications can lead to problems of model
misspeciﬁcation and erroneous inference. No empirical study (that we know of) in the
extant literature on the relation between option‐based compensation and corporate
ﬁnancial decisions has formally made these distinctions.
Cash holdings are particularly adapted to the study of managerial incentives and
corporate decision making because the decision to deploy or accumulate cash in excess of
what is necessary to meet the needs of normal business transactions and any contractual
obligations such as liquidity covenants is to a large extent at the discretion of managers with
little scope for external scrutiny.1 Thus, given the propensity for accumulated cash to lower
ﬁrm risk (Kim,Mauer, and Sherman 1998;Opler et al. 1999;Ozkan andOzkan 2004), it is an
excellent instrument for a manager seeking to implement personally advantageous corporate
policies that are inconsistent with the risk preferences of shareholders. This is reﬂected in the
fact that it has ﬁgured prominently in the recent compensation literature (e.g., Chava and
Purnanandam 2010; Liu and Mauer 2011; Tong 2010).
As in several recent studies that use the concepts of vega and delta2 from option
pricing theory to examine the relation between managerial ﬁnancial decisions and
managerial risk incentives (e.g., Guay 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006), there is no
consistent evidence in the cash holdings literature of how and why vega and delta affect
managerial behaviour. For instance, Chava and Purnanandam (2010) document a
signiﬁcant positive relation between chief executive ofﬁcer (CEO) delta and cash
holdings, and an inverse relation between CEO vega and cash holdings. Tong (2010)
documents a signiﬁcant negative relation between CEO delta and vega and cash holdings,
whereas Liu and Mauer (2011) provide evidence of a weak negative relation between
delta and cash holdings but a strong positive relation between vega and cash holdings. The
authors argue that their results support the argument of increased precautionary cash
holdings to avoid costly external funding as well as a higher cost of debt to satisfy debt
holders.
These conﬂicting arguments, and mixed results warrant further investigation and
analysis, especially with respect to the apparent contradictory interpretations of vega and
delta. For example, in the studies presented above, both vega and delta can either be risk‐
inducing incentives or proxies for increased risk aversion. In Chava and Purnanandam
(2010) vega is the option incentive that reduces cash holdings and delta is the risk aversion
proxy that increases them. In Liu and Mauer (2011) vega is risk reducing and delta is risk
inducing. In Tong (2010) both vega and delta are risk‐inducing incentives.3
1See Liu and Mauer (2011) for a discussion of the relation between cash holdings and convenants.
2Vega corresponds to the change in managerial wealth with respect to the change in the volatility of the ﬁrm’s
returns whereas delta corresponds to the change in managerial wealth with respect to a change in the value of the
ﬁrm’s stock. It is well known in option pricing theory that an increase in the riskiness of a standard option’s
underlying asset increases the value of the option.
3Similar results can be found in other sectors of the corporate compensation literature. Coles Daniel, and
Naveen (2006) on a wide array of corporate policies, Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010) on the maturity structure
of corporate debt, Grant, Markarian, and Parbonetti (2009) on accruals management, and Knopf, Nam, and Thorton
(2002) on corporate hedging use vega as a risk‐inducing incentive and delta as a risk‐reducing incentive. However,
Daniel, Spencer, and Naveen (2004) on the pricing of debt and equity ﬁnd that both vega and delta are risk inducing.
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We resolve some of the foregoing contradictions and extend the literature by
developing an innovative empirical model based on the Ross (2004) results that
distinguish among the convexity effect, the magniﬁcation effect, and the translation
effect. This makes it possible to identify the relevant option‐based incentives and their
effect on managerial risk aversion and specify how each affects cash holdings. Our
ﬁndings provide explanations for some of the discrepancies in the outstanding literature
and have important implications for corporate policies and legislative regulations on
executive compensation.
Using the Black–Scholes option pricer to estimate option values, deltas, and
vegas, we show that the convexity and magniﬁcation effects reduce managerial risk
aversion. We also identify the change in delta as a key variable and show that it is
negatively related to the reduction in risk aversion. The implication is that the alignment
of managerial and shareholder interests that comes about through lower risk aversion,
which induces managers to lower cash holdings in favor of riskier assets, is reduced by
increases in delta. As in Ross (2004), the translation effect depends on the managerial
utility function.4 For utility functions with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), the
most common assumption, its effect is negative. Its effect is positive with increasing
absolute risk aversion (IARA) and neutral with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA),
and there is no reason why absolute risk aversion could not be constant or increasing.5 For
example, IARA due to low diversiﬁcation would explain the undiversiﬁed manager’s
decision to increase cash holdings at the expense of more proﬁtable risky assets. We show
that the effect of delta and vega on risk aversion depends on the managerial utility
function. The implication is that the effect of delta and vega on cash holdings depends on
whether the manager has DARA, IARA, or CARA.
In the main contribution of this article, we use UK data6 to provide strong
empirical evidence that the change in delta is a key option‐based compensation incentive
that is positively related to cash holdings. The implication is that this reﬂects the positive
relation between the change in delta and risk aversion due to its effect on magniﬁcation
and convexity. We also provide evidence that because of the signiﬁcant negative relation
between delta and vega and cash holdings, UKmanagers generally exhibit DARA. These
results are robust with respect to alternative speciﬁcations, when incentives are extended
to include all executive board members and when the sample is broken down according to
different risk characteristics. We show that omitting the change in delta as an explanatory
variable renders delta insigniﬁcant as an explanatory variable, an indication of potential
misspeciﬁcation in models where the change in delta is not included.
4Ross (2004) calls this moving the evaluation to a different part of the domain of the original utility function
where the utility function can have greater or lesser risk aversion.
5The link between wealth and risk aversion depends on the utility function. For example, when Becker (2006)
uses wealth to proxy for risk aversion, he implicitly assumes DARA.
6TheUnited Kingdom is particularly interesting for the testing we propose. It has strong shareholder protection
similar to that of the United States, but evidence in the corporate governance literature suggests that ﬁrm‐level
mechanisms, such as corporate boards, are poor monitors of managerial actions (see Weir, Laing, and
McKnight 2002; Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). Thus, in the absence of effective ﬁrm‐level monitoring mechanisms,
managerial compensation incentives might have more importance.
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II. Model Development
The Ross (2004) analysis of the effect of convex compensation structures and managerial
attitudes to risk are based on the Pratt (1964) measure of absolute risk aversion and the
assumption that managers are risk averse. Risk aversion means that each manager has a
utility function u(w) satisfying the following conditions:
u0ðwÞ  0;u00ðwÞ  0;8w; ð1Þ
where primes denote ﬁrst and second derivatives with respect to wealth, denoted as w.
Utility functions such as these are strictly concave. Pratt shows that maximizing the
expected utility of a risk‐averse economic agent is approximately equal to:
A ¼ u
00ðwÞ
u0ðwÞ ; ð2Þ
where A represents the degree of absolute risk aversion and measures how much the
economic agent (in the case of Ross, the manager) dislikes the uncertainty he faces. A can
be increasing in w (the ﬁrst derivative with respect to w is positive7), decreasing in w (the
ﬁrst derivative with respect tow is negative8), or constant (the ﬁrst derivative with respect
to w is zero9). This gives rise to the terminology increasing, decreasing, and constant
absolute risk aversion (IARA, DARA, and CARA respectively).
Starting from here, Ross deﬁnes the derived utility function as u(f(x))¼ v(x),
where wealth (f) is a derivative security whose value depends on the value of an
underlying asset denoted as x. The derived coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion is given as:
AvðxÞ ¼  v
00ðxÞ
v0ðxÞ : ð3Þ
Ross shows that whether the derived utility function is more or less risk averse
than the original depends on three effects—the convexity effect, the magniﬁcation effect,
and the translation effect—where the net effect on risk aversion can be measured as:
AvðxÞ  AðxÞ ¼ Convexity effectþMagnification effectþ Translation effect: ð4Þ
The convexity effect measures how the payoff schedule of the wealth function
affects managerial risk aversion. For example, the convexity of a payoff schedule like a
call option clearly makes risky bets more desirable. It is deﬁned as:
Convexity effect ¼  f
00ðxÞ
f 0ðxÞ : ð5Þ
7 IARA implies dAdw ¼  u
00 ðwÞ
u0 ðwÞ
h i0
> 0:
8DARA implies dAdw ¼  u
00ðwÞ
u0ðwÞ
h i0
< 0:
9CARA implies dAdw ¼  u
00ðwÞ
u0ðwÞ
h i0
¼ 0:
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The magniﬁcation effect reﬂects how different levels of exposure to the ﬁrm’s
share price affect managerial risk aversion. It is deﬁned as:
Magnification effect ¼ Aðf Þ f 0ðxÞ  1½ : ð6Þ
The translation effect measures how different levels of wealth affect managerial
risk aversion as the fee schedule shifts or translates the evaluation of any bet to a different
portion of the domain of the agent’s utility function. Thus, it depends onwhether the agent
has DARA, IARA, or CARA. It is deﬁned as:
Translation effect ¼ Aðf Þ  AðxÞ: ð7Þ
As Ross (2004) emphasizes, one merit of this decomposition is that these three
effects are locally independent, in the sense that for a given utility function, each can vary
without affecting the others. We now use this insight and these three effects in the context
of the Black–Scholes option pricer to develop an empirical model for testing the effect of
ﬁrm‐based compensation on managerial risk aversion.
Consider a manager whose ﬁrm‐based wealth, denoted by f(x), consists of a call
option on one share of the ﬁrm’s stock with a market price denoted as x that follows
geometric Brownian motion:10
dx ¼ axdt þ sxdz; ð8Þ
where a is the drift parameter, s is the standard deviation of dx/x, and dz is a standard
Wiener process with zero mean and variance of dt.
The well‐known Black–Scholes European option pricer can be used to value the
call option on an asset that follows a process represented in equation (8):
f ðxÞ ¼ xNðd1Þ  erðTtÞXNðd2Þ: ð9Þ
N(di) i ¼ 1; 2 is the standard normal cumulative evaluated at d1 and d2, where d1 ¼
lnðxt=X Þþðrþs2=2ÞðTtÞ
s
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp and d2 ¼
lnðxt=X Þþðrs2=2ÞðTtÞ
s
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp ; r is the risk‐free interest rate; X is the
strike price; and (T–t) is the time to maturity. We use the Black–Scholes option pricer
because most stock options used in compensation packages are relatively simple call
options. Although many do have special features, such as vesting periods or variable
exercise prices, their pricing and risk management parameters, like delta and vega, play
the same role as these same parameters in the plain vanilla European‐style option pricers.
Thus, the insights derived from the simple option pricing models can be extended to
10For expository convenience to identify the pertinent variables and their effect on risk aversion, we consider
only option‐based ﬁrm wealth. It is straightforward to incorporate portfolios of individual options and outright
shareholdings in the analysis because the pertinent variables for the portfolios are linear combinations of the
variables of the individual options and shareholdings.
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include most of the stock options included in managerial compensation packages. The
Black–Scholes option pricer is the generic option pricing model that has stood the test of
time and is also the simplest and easiest to apply (see, e.g., Black 1989).
In the empirical section that follows we want to examine the relation between
ﬁrm‐based compensation incentives and cash holdings. The argument is that corporate
cash holdings are partly determined by the effect of the payoff schedule of ﬁrm‐based
compensation on managerial risk aversion. As discussed above, risk aversion is affected
by the payoff schedule of the wealth‐generating function that is reﬂected in the translation,
magniﬁcation, and convexity effects. Without knowledge of the speciﬁc managerial
utility function it is not possible to measure risk aversion and the three payoff schedule
effects directly. However, if we know the general type of utility function (DARA, IARA,
or CARA) and the wealth‐generating function, several interesting relations can be
derived.
First, consider the convexity effect. The convexity effect of equation (5) in the
context of the Black–Scholes option pricer is straightforward. f 0ðxÞ corresponds to delta
and f 00ðxÞ corresponds to gamma where 0 < f 0ðxÞ < 1 and 0 < f 00ðxÞ. Because both are
positive, the convexity effect on managerial risk aversion is negative.11 As discussed in
the Introduction, delta ﬁgures prominently in the empirical literature on the option‐based
incentives embedded in managerial compensation and its effect is ambiguous. To see how
delta affects the convexity effect, let delta change while holding gamma constant:12
d  f 00ðxÞ
f 0ðxÞ
h i
d f 0ðxÞ½  ¼
f 00ðxÞ
f 0ðxÞ2 > 0: ð10Þ
This derivative is positive because both f 00ðxÞ and f0(x) are positive. Thus, an
increase in delta will reduce the effect of convexity and increase managerial risk aversion.
A similar operation can be performed on the magniﬁcation effect deﬁned in
equation (6).13 Because f 0ðxÞ is positive and less than 1, the magniﬁcation effect on risk
aversion is also negative. The effect of a change in delta on magniﬁcation is given by
holding f(x) constant and letting delta change:14
d Aðf Þ f 0ðxÞ  1½ ½ 
d f 0ðxÞ½  ¼ Aðf Þ > 0: ð11Þ
11The Black–Scholes formula for the delta and gamma of a European call option are, respectively, D ¼
f 0ðxÞ ¼ Nðd1Þ and G ¼ f 00ðxÞ ¼ 1
sx
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pðTtÞ
p eðd1Þ
2
2 .
12For example, in the context of a simple call option this can be achieved bymaking appropriate changes in the
strike price and the option’s time to maturity. In the more general context of a portfolio of options and shares the
same effect can be achieved by adding an option or portfolio of options or options and shares with a different delta
but the same gamma.
13Remember that for a given utility function each effect can vary without affecting the others.
14Again, this can be achieved by making appropriate changes in the strike price and the option’s time to
maturity.
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This derivative is positive because A(f) is positive due to the risk aversion
postulated in equation (1).
Thus, an increase in delta will reduce the effects of convexity and magniﬁcation
and increase managerial risk aversion. This implies that if managers are using cash
holdings to manipulate ﬁrm risk for their own personal beneﬁt at the expense of
shareholders, an increase in managerial delta will increase cash holdings.
The translation effect on risk aversion deﬁned in equation (7) depends onwhether
the manager’s utility function has DARA, IARA, or CARA. Since f< x, the effect is
positive with DARA, it is negative with IARA, and it is equal to zero with CARA. To see
how delta affects the translation effect, take the derivative of equation (7) with respect to x,
which gives:
d Aðf Þ  AðxÞ½ 
dx
¼  u
000ðf Þ
u0ðf Þ þ
u00ðf Þ2
u0ðf Þ2
" #
f 0ðxÞ   u
000ðxÞ
u0ðxÞ þ
u00ðxÞ2
u0ðxÞ2
" #
: ð12Þ
For CARA utility functions, both parentheses on the right‐hand side of equation
(12) are equal to zero, so for CARA utility functions delta does not affect the translation
effect. For DARA and IARA utility functions, both parentheses have the same sign. For
DARA they are negative. Thus, because f 0ðxÞ is positive, higher levels of delta increase
the absolute value of the ﬁrst term on the right‐hand side of the equation and,
consequently, decrease the translation effect (which is positive because f < x) for utility
functions with DARA. In other words, f 0ðxÞ has a negative effect on risk aversion. For
IARA utility functions both parentheses are positive. Thus, higher levels of delta have a
positive effect on the translation effect and risk aversion.
From this we conclude that for managers with DARA delta is negatively related
to cash holdings, for managers with IARA managerial delta is positively related to cash
holdings, and for managers with CARA managerial delta is not related to cash holdings.
Thus, in the empirical model that we test below delta and the change in delta are important
determinants of risk aversion and cash holdings, with effects that can be complementary
or offsetting. In the model developed above, change in delta, through its effect on
convexity and magniﬁcation, always has a positive effect on risk aversion and, as a
consequence, on cash holdings. Delta itself, through its effect on translation, can have a
positive, negative, or null effect on risk aversion and cash holdings depending on whether
themanagerial utility function is DARA, IARA, or CARA. Thus, for an unbiased estimate
of the effect of ﬁrm‐based compensation onmanagerial risk taking, both variables must be
included. Consider, for example, a managerial utility function with DARA. The effect of
delta will be negative and the effect of the change in delta will be positive. Omitting the
change in delta will concentrate the three effects of risk aversion on delta alone, thereby
affecting the estimated coefﬁcient. If the translation effect is considerably stronger than
the convexity and magniﬁcation effects, the coefﬁcient will have the right sign but its
signiﬁcance will be diminished or eliminated. If the convexity and magniﬁcation effects
are stronger than the translation effect, the coefﬁcient could even change signs.
This brings up the question of vega, the change in the price of the option with
respect to a change in the volatility of the stock return. Although vega does not appear
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directly as a determinant of managerial risk aversion in the three effects outlined above, it
could affect risk aversion indirectly through the effect of sigma onmanagerial wealth. It is
well known in the option pricing literature that vega ¼ dfds > 0.15 An increase in sigma
increases the manager’s ﬁrm‐based wealth.16 The higher the vega, the larger is the
increase in wealth. An increase in wealth affects risk aversion depending on whether the
manager has DARA, IARA, or CARA. As with delta, the effect is negative with DARA,
positive with IARA, and equal to zero with CARA. Thus, other things being equal, higher
levels of vega should increase the incentive of managers with DARA to reduce cash
holdings in favor of riskier investments. Higher levels of vega and the higher levels of
wealth it implies should increase the incentive of managers with IARA to increase cash
holdings at the expense of riskier investments. Higher levels of vega should have no effect
on managers with CARA.
In the empirical model we include vega as an explanatory variable because of its
potential effect on risk aversion through the wealth effect. We show that both vega and
delta affect risk aversion in a similar manner. The effect is negative with DARA, positive
with IARA, and equal to zero with CARA. Thus, if our analysis is correct, they should
both have the same sign with respect to cash holdings.
III. Data and Sample Construction
To carry out the empirical analysis, we collected executive compensation data and corporate
governance data from the BoardEx database for a sample of UK ﬁrms listed on the London
Stock Exchange for 2000–2004. BoardEx is a UK‐based ﬁrm that provides biographical
information on senior executives and board members of U.S. and European public and
private ﬁrms. It also provides detailed information on the compensation (salaries, bonuses,
pensions, long‐term incentive plans, option, and share grants) of senior executives.
Additionally, the data on the market value of equity and the accounting data were
collected from Datastream. Firms classiﬁed as ﬁnancial ﬁrms were excluded from the
sample (Standard Industry Classiﬁcation codes between 8000 and 8999) because
regulatory obligations require such companies to maintain speciﬁed cash holdings. The
ﬁnal unbalanced sample consists of 357 nonﬁnancial UK ﬁrms.
Main Variables: Cash Holdings, CEO Delta, Change in CEO Delta, CEO Vega, and
CEO Cash Compensation
Cash holdings is measured as cash and marketable securities to total assets (Cash_Ta).
This deﬁnition is consistent with the corporate liquidity measure employed by Ozkan and
15The Black–Scholes formula for the vega of a European call option is:
@f
@s ¼ x
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T  tp 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p e
ðd1Þ2
2 :
16Other things being equal, the vega of a share is equal to zero. Like delta, the vega of managerial total wealth is
a weighted average of the vegas of the individual shareholdings and options:
vega ¼Pi zivegai:
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Ozkan (2004) for their UK sample. The compensation data on the CEO is consistent with
prior studies that use delta and vega (Guay 1999; Knopf, Nam, and Thorton 2002; Coles,
Daniel, and Naveen 2006; Tong 2010). CEO vega is deﬁned as the pound change in the
CEO’s ﬁrm‐based wealth corresponding to a change of 1% in the volatility of stock
returns (CEO_Vega).17 CEO delta is deﬁned as the pound change in the CEO’s ﬁrm‐based
wealth following a 1% change in the ﬁrm’s stock price (CEO_Delta).18 The change in
CEO delta is deﬁned as [CEO_DeltaTCEO_DeltaT1] (CEO_Delta_Chng).19 Finally,
CEO salary and bonus is measured as annual direct cash compensation plus annual cash
bonus (CEO_SalBon). Following Guay (1999) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), all
compensation structures are measured in the thousands of dollars. Additional data
collected fromBoardEx include the total number of directors on the board and the number
of nonexecutive directors on the board.
Control Variables
The control variables employed in this study are all consistent with prior studies on
corporate cash holdings. We ﬁrst control for corporate governance mechanisms. The
composition of board of directors is considered as a central ﬁrmmechanism for mitigating
the agency costs stemming from the separation of ownership and control. Fama and
Jensen (1983) describe the board of directors as the “apex body” of an organization’s
internal governance system, and Weisbach (1988) describes it as the shareholders’ ﬁrst
line of defense against the incumbent management, or at least the second‐best efﬁcient
solution (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). Following previous studies, we control for the
effectiveness of ﬁrm‐level governance by board size and board independence. Board size
is measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of directors on the board (Bsize),
and board independence is measured as the ratio of total nonexecutive directors to total
board members (Nex%).
Second, we include the following ﬁrm characteristics. The annualized standard
deviation of daily stock returns proxies for ﬁrm risk (Firm_Risk). Leverage is deﬁned as
the ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage).We use themarket‐to‐book ratio deﬁned as
the book value of assets, less the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity,
divided by book value of assets to proxy growth opportunities (Mktbv). The natural
logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy for ﬁrm size (Firm_Size).20 The ratio of capital
expenditure to total assets measures the level of conservative investment policy engaged
by the ﬁrm (Capex_Ta) and the ratio of the sum of research and development to total
assets measures the level of risky investments engaged by the ﬁrm (RDSAG_Ta). The
descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 1.
The correlation matrix, presented in Table 2, shows some correlation between
ﬁrm size and the compensation variables.We do not consider this correlation high enough
to cause concern for issues related to multicollinearity. However, as a robustness test to
17We assume that the vega of outright shareholdings is equal to 0.
18The delta of outright shareholdings is equal to 1.
19The change in the delta of outright shareholdings is equal to 0.
20 In unreported analysis, we measured ﬁrm size as the natural logarithm of net assets. The results are
quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the results with ﬁrm size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets.
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control for potential estimation bias, we orthogonalize ﬁrm size with respect to vega,
delta, change in delta, and cash compensation by regressing ﬁrm size on these variables
and saving the residuals as the orthogonalized ﬁrm size variable. In this way, we eliminate
the collinearity but respect the integrity of the model. The results using the orthogonalized
variable are quantitatively and qualitatively similar.
IV. Empirical Results
In the multivariate regression analysis used to examine the impact of CEO compensation
structures on corporate cash holdings, one prominent issue is the potential endogeneity
between cash holdings and the hypothesized determinants such as managerial
compensation structures. In addition to endogeneity, another important issue that
plagues previous studies on cash holdings (e.g., Chava and Purnanandam 2010; Liu and
Mauer 2011; Tong 2010) is that these studies implicitly assume that ﬁrms can
immediately adjust corporate cash holdings following changes in ﬁrm characteristics,
compensation structures, and/or random shocks. However, in an imperfect market,
adjustment and transaction costs may prevent ﬁrms from rapidly moving toward optimal
cash holdings. This implies that the observed cash holdings may deviate from optimal
levels for a period of time. For this reason we adopt a dynamic (partial target adjustment)
cash holdings model by including the lagged dependent variable among the explanatory
variables.
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th
Cash_Ta 0.135 0.166 0.032 0.079 0.166
CEO_Vega 23.063 160.242 0.223 1.253 3.812
CEO_Delta 94.289 400.952 9.000 22.000 56.000
CEO_Delta_Chng 13.256 449.568 13.000 3.000 15.000
CEO_SalBon 516.390 444.014 260.500 395.600 620.000
Bsize 2.084 0.311 1.946 2.079 2.303
Nex% 0.530 0.140 0.429 0.533 0.625
Firm_Risk 0.383 0.235 0.237 0.321 0.459
Leverage 0.227 0.214 0.072 0.201 0.327
Mktbv 2.071 2.612 1.119 1.447 2.121
Firm_Size 12.897 1.827 11.640 12.736 14.123
Capex_Ta 0.150 3.481 0.023 0.046 0.084
RDSAG_Ta 0.283 0.298 0.077 0.206 0.388
Note: Cash_TA is the ratio of total cash and cash equivalents to total assets. CEO_Vega is the dollar change in the
CEO’s option portfolio for a 0.01 change in stock return standard deviation measured in thousands. CEO_Delta is
the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock price, measured in thousands. CEO_Delta_Chng is the
ﬁrst difference of CEO_Delta. CEO_SalBon is the cash salary plus cash bonus compensation received by the CEO,
measured in thousands. Bsize is the natural logarithm of total directors on the board. Nex% is the ratio of total
nonexecutive directors on the board to total directors on the board. Firm_Risk is the annualized standard deviation of
year t’s daily stock return. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets.Mktbv is measured as the book value of
assets, less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by book value of assets.Firm_Size is the
natural logarithm of total assets.Capex_Ta is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets.RDSAG_Ta is the ratio of
research and development to total assets.
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To account for the above‐mentioned empirical issues, we use an instrumental
variables estimation method, where the second lagged values of the endogenous variables
are used as instruments. In particular, we employ the generalized method of moments
(GMM) system estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998) for the
following reasons. First, the dependent variable (Cash_Ta) is dynamic, in the sense that it
depends on previous realizations. Second, the panel consists of few periods (small T) and
a large number of ﬁrms (largeN). Third, the GMM system explicitly allows for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within ﬁrms. Furthermore, to account for the fact
that the consistency of estimates is dependent on an optimal choice of instruments, where
the validity of instruments is subject to the absence of higher order serial correlation
among the idiosyncratic component of the error term, we include a test for second‐
order correlation. We also report the test statistic for the Hansen test (Hansen 1982)
for overidentifying restrictions to indicate whether instruments and residuals are
independent.
The results of the GMM system are reported in Table 3. We ﬁrst estimated a cash
holdings model without CEO_Delta_Chng variable, termed model 1. We then
reestimated the model including CEO_Delta_Chng to gauge directly the effect of
omitting it. This is termed model 2. By and large, the results presented in Table 3 provide
signiﬁcant evidence of the impact of CEO compensation sensitivities and, by extension,
CEO risk incentives in determining cash holding policies.
The results of model 1 suggest that cash compensation (CEO_SalBon) has a
signiﬁcant positive impact on cash holdings and CEO_Vega has a signiﬁcant negative
impact on cash holding. On the other hand, CEO_Delta does not affect cash holdings and
this ﬁnding is consistent with prior studies such as Liu andMauer (2011) and the majority
of results presented by Tong (2010).
The results for model 2 question the robustness of the results obtained in model
1. When CEO_Delta_Chng is included, CEO_Delta becomes signiﬁcant, suggesting
possible misspeciﬁcation of the original model. CEO_Delta Chng has the predicted
sign and is signiﬁcant. Based on the argument that CEOs can and do use cash holdings
to manipulate the risk proﬁle of the ﬁrm, the signiﬁcant positive relation between
the change in delta and cash holdings is evidence that CEO compensation incentives
do affect CEO behavior through their effect on risk aversion as reﬂected in
the effect of changes in delta on convexity and magniﬁcation in equations (10) and
(11). With respect to the controversial relation between cash holdings and CEO
delta, we report a highly signiﬁcant negative relation at the 1% level. Based on
equation (12), this suggests that the CEOs in our sample have utility functions with
DARA.
Delta reﬂects the effect of risk aversion on cash holdings induced by changes in
the ﬁrm’s share price and its sign signals whether the utility function is DARA, IARA,
or CARA. Vega reﬂects the effect of risk aversion on cash holdings induced by changes
in the volatility of the ﬁrm’s share price. Its sign also signals whether the utility
function is DARA, IARA, or CARA. Thus, although the source of the effect differs
from delta to vega, other things being equal, both variables should have the same sign.
Vega is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, which is consistent with the ﬁndings of
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) and Tong (2010). The negative relation between vega
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TABLE 3. Dynamic Panel Analysis of Corporate Cash Holdings on CEO Compensation Sensitivities,
Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Firm Characteristics.
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Cash_Tat–1 0.60956 0.71385
(.000) (.000)
CEO_Vega 0.00054 0.00021
(.000) (.001)
CEO_Delta 9.34e06 0.00005
(.164) (.000)
CEO_Delta_Chng 0.00005
(.000)
CEO_SalBon 0.00002 0.00001
(.000) (.000)
Bsize 0.03094 0.05616
(.018) (.000)
Nex% 0.05993 0.04223
(.016) (.032)
Firm_Risk 0.00452 0.01070
(.654) (.201)
Leverage 0.01240 0.00419
(.248) (.526)
Mktbv 0.01332 0.01702
(.000) (.000)
Firm_Size 0.01493 0.00467
(.000) (.187)
Capex_Ta 0.17658 0.31036
(.000) (.000)
RDSAG_Ta 0.02447 0.02045
(.005) (.002)
N 938 844
Wald Chi2‐stat 6,575.12 17,964.08
AR(1) 3.51 3.44
AR(2) 1.32 0.58
Hansen test 132.10 125.83
Note: The dependent variable for regressions isCash_TA, measured as the ratio of total cash and cash equivalents to
total assets. Cash_Tat–1 is the value of Cash_TA lagged one period. CEO_Vega is the dollar change in the CEO’s
option portfolio for a 0.01 change in stock return standard deviation measured in thousands.CEO_Delta is the dollar
change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock price, measured in thousands. CEO_Delta_Chng is the ﬁrst
difference of CEO_Delta. CEO_SalBon is the cash salary plus cash bonus compensation received by the CEO,
measured in thousands. Bsize is the natural logarithm of total directors on the board. Nex% is the ratio of total
nonexecutive directors on the board to total directors on the board. Firm_Risk is the annualized standard deviation of
year t’s daily stock return. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets.Mktbv is measured as the book value of
assets, less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by book value of assets. Firm_Size is the
natural logarithm of total assets.Capex_Ta is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets.RDSAG_Ta is the ratio of
research and development plus selling to total assets. Although not reported, models 1 and 2 include industry and
year effects and a constant term. AR(1) and AR(2) are test statistics for ﬁrst‐ and second‐order autocorrelation in the
residuals, respectively, distributed as standard normalN (0, 1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test is a
test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi‐square under the null of instrument validity. The p‐values are
presented in parentheses.
Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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and cash holdings is consistent with the negative sign of delta and is further evidence of
DARA.21
The signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on vega, in models 1 and 2 is evidence that
higher volatility increases option‐based wealth, and because managers have DARA, they
are willing to reduce cash holdings in favor of the riskier investments. Ultimately, this
result suggests that higher sensitivity to stock return volatility in managerial
compensation reduces potential agency costs stemming from corporate cash holdings.
The caveat is that this will be the case only if managers have DARA. Overall the ﬁndings
highlight that vega and delta enhance managerial risk incentives, thereby reducing risk‐
related agency costs while the change in delta induces greater managerial risk aversion
through its effect on convexity and magniﬁcation.
To be consistent with prior studies we also controlled for the effect of corporate
governance mechanisms on cash holdings (see, e.g., Belghitar and Khan 2013). Board
size (Bsize) has a highly signiﬁcant negative relation with cash holdings, which is
consistent with the arguments posited byDalton, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) that larger
boards are better equipped to monitor managerial actions and act in shareholder interest.
Furthermore, the coefﬁcient on board independence (Nex%) is positive and signiﬁcant at
the 5% level, and at the 1% in model (2). Yermack (1996) and Agrawal and Knoeber
(1996) argue that such results might be indicative of nonexecutives lacking requisite skills
necessary to monitor managers.
Turning to the other control variables, the coefﬁcient of the one‐period lagged
value of cash holdings (Cash_Tat–1) is highly signiﬁcant and positively related to current
cash holding levels at the 1% signiﬁcance level across all models. This highlights the
importance of accounting for the dynamic nature of corporate cash holdings, as past levels
have a direct inﬂuence on current levels of cash holdings. The coefﬁcient of the growth
opportunity set (Mktbv) is positive and highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The coefﬁcient
of ﬁrm size (Firm_Size) is negative and highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The level of
capital expenditure (Capex_Ta) is documented as having a highly signiﬁcant negative
relation with cash holdings at the 1% level. Furthermore, there is evidence of a highly
signiﬁcant positive relation between the levels of research and development, selling,
administrative and general expense, and cash holdings at the 1% level. Finally, there is no
signiﬁcant evidence that ﬁrm risk has any effect on cash holdings. These results are
consistent with the ﬁndings documented byKim,Mauer, and Sherman (1998), Opler et al.
(1999), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Chava and Purnanandam (2010), Liu and Mauer
(2011), and Tong (2010).
21The different signs found by Liu and Mauer (2011) could be due to the omitted variable Change in Delta. It
could also be due to the complicated relation between cash holdings and vega shown by Liu and Mauer, especially
with respect to debt ﬁnancing and liquidity covenants. Thus, besides thewealth‐increasing risk incentive, our ﬁnding
of a negative relation between vega and cash holdings could also reﬂect a lower incidence of debt ﬁnancing and
frequency of liquidity covenants due to the fact that UK credit markets are less sophisticated than those in the United
States.
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Risk Environments, Risk Incentives, and Cash Holdings
The effectiveness of managerial incentives may vary across organizational environments
as it does in other governance mechanisms (Hutchinson and Gul 2004). For example,
based on the plausible assumption that there is an upper limit on how much volatility a
ﬁrm can proﬁtably bear, for a given delta or vega, the scope for risk‐increasing actions
may be lower in higher risk ﬁrms. As a robustness check of the foregoing results, we
investigate whether the effect of option‐based incentives on cash holdings varies with
respect to the risk environment of the ﬁrm. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) argue that
targeting ﬁrm resources toward greater levels of research and development represents
engagement in risky investment policies. Additionally, a more direct measure of the
riskiness of a ﬁrm relates to the volatility of its stock returns. We use these two criteria to
assess the impact of CEO compensation incentives on cash holdings in differing risk
environments.
First, we split the sample into three categories. Firms with the ratio of research
development, selling, administrative, and general expenses to sales (RDSAG_Sales) less
than the 40th percentile of the sample are classiﬁed as low‐risk ﬁrms, and ﬁrms with
RDSAG_Sales greater than the 60th percentile of the sample RDSAG_Sales are classiﬁed
as high‐risk ﬁrms. For robustness, the sample is also split on a similar basis into low‐risk
and high‐risk subsamples using the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns
(Firm_Risk). Models 1 and 2 are ﬁrm risk regressions using RDSAG_Sales subsamples,
and models 3 and 4 use Firm_Risk subsamples.
Table 4 presents the results of the tests on the subsamples using the complete set
of explanatory variables, which are comparable to the results of model 2 in Table 3. The
results suggest that although the coefﬁcients on delta, vega, and the change in delta for the
subsamples have the same signs and remain statistically signiﬁcant irrespective of the
riskiness of the environment in which the ﬁrm operates, the size of the coefﬁcients is
smaller for the higher risk environments. This is evidence that although compensation
incentives remain relevant for differing risk environments, the scope for risk‐increasing
actions is reduced for environments with higher risk. Overall, the ﬁndings speak to the
strength of structuring managerial compensation based on the assumption of DARA
irrespective of the operational environment’s level of risk.
The Executive Team, Risk Incentives, and Cash Holdings
Some studies argue that that corporate decisions are often made in teams, which can
change the decision making dynamics (see, e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick 2003). To
account for the effect of other members of the ﬁrm’s executive team of directors in
shaping corporate cash holdings, we examine the impact of the average executive delta,
average executive vega, and the change in the average executive delta on corporate cash
holdings using the GMM system estimator. The results are presented in Table 5.
These results closely mirror the results presented in Table 3. The average
executive vega is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level across all models. The change in
the average executive delta is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in models 1 and 2. In
model 2 average executive delta is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. However,
when the change in executive delta is omitted from the cash holding speciﬁcation inmodel
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TABLE 4. Dynamic Panel Analysis of Cash Holdings on Firm Characteristics and CEO Compensation
Sensitivities within Various Risk Environments.
Variables
R&D Firm Risk
High Low High Low
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Cash_Tat–1 0.73936 0.79799 0.57516 0.75652
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
CEO_Vega 0.00020 0.00061 0.00034 0.00039
(.001) (.000) (.017) (.000)
CEO_Delta 0.00003 0.00010 0.00012 0.00002
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
CEO_Delta_Chng 0.00003 0.00006 0.00007 0.00001
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
CEO_SalBon 0.00002 0.00002 8.38e06 1.97e06
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.643)
Bsize 0.09601 0.01312 0.02120 0.02142
(.000) (.129) (.000) (.003)
Nex% 0.02275 0.12567 0.04840 0.00760
(.029) (.000) (.000) (.546)
Firm_Risk 0.01703 0.01153 0.00880 0.09114
(.002) (.014) (.006) (.000)
Leverage 0.05509 0.01528 0.00679 0.06001
(.000) (.254) (.001) (.000)
Mktbv 0.01431 0.00767 0.01999 0.01803
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Firm_Size 0.00734 0.01205 0.00890 0.00653
(.006) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Capex_Ta 0.17803 0.36011 0.49063 0.14289
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
RDSAG_Ta 0.02685 0.04438 0.01144 0.04266
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
N 328 357 309 355
Wald Chi2‐stat 5.33e06 2.25e07 2.53e06 80573.48
AR(1) 2.42 3.18 2.61 4.18
AR(2) 0.47 0.43 0.94 0.03
Hansen test 91.49 105.74 114.65 125.76
Note: Models 1 and 2 are regression results for high RDSAG_Sales ﬁrms (ratio of research development, selling,
administrative, and general expenses to sales) and low RDSAG_Sales ﬁrms, respectively. Models 3 and 4 present
regression results for high Firm_Risk (stock return volatility) ﬁrms and low Firm_Risk ﬁrms, respectively. The
dependent variable isCash_TAmeasured as the ratio of total cash and cash equivalents to total assets.Cash_Tat–1 is
the value of Cash_TA lagged one period. CEO_Vega is the dollar change in the CEO’s option portfolio for a 0.01
change in stock return standard deviation measured in thousands.CEO_Delta is the dollar change in CEOwealth for
a 1% change in stock price, measured in thousands. CEO_Delta_Chng is the ﬁrst difference of CEO_Delta.
CEO_SalBon is the cash salary plus cash bonus compensation received by the CEO, measured in thousands. Bsize is
the natural logarithm of total directors on the board. Nex% is the ratio of total nonexecutive directors on the board to
total directors on the board. Firm_Risk is the annualized standard deviation of year t’s daily stock return. Leverage is
the ratio of total debt to total assets.Mktbv is measured as the book value of assets, less the book value of equity plus
the market value of equity, divided by book value of assets. Firm_Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.
Capex_Ta is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. RDSAG_Ta is the ratio of research and development to
total assets. Although not reported, models 1–4 include industry and year effects and a constant term. AR(1) and
AR(2) are test statistics for ﬁrst‐ and second‐order autocorrelation in the residuals, respectively, distributed as
standard normal N (0, 1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions,
distributed as chi‐square under the null of instrument validity. The p‐values are presented in parentheses.
Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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TABLE 5. Dynamic Panel Analysis of Corporate Cash Holdings on Executive Team Compensation
Sensitivities, Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Firm Characteristics.
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Cash_Tat–1 0.53829 0.66559
(.000) (.000)
A_Vega 0.00003 0.00002
(.000) (.000)
A_Delta 6.84e06 0.00003
(.717) (.000)
A_Delta_Chng 0.00002
(.000)
A_SalBon 0.00003 0.00002
(.000) (.000)
Bsize 0.04377 0.03699
(.002) (.004)
Nex% 0.12008 0.03834
(.000) (.075)
Firm_Risk 0.01947 0.02180
(.047) (.010)
Leverage 0.04995 0.00161
(.002) (.877)
Mktbv 0.01437 0.01329
(.000) (.000)
Firm_Size 0.02109 0.01496
(.000) (.000)
Capex_Ta 0.15695 0.33404
(.000) (.000)
RDSAG_Ta 0.00967 0.02241
(.356) (.016)
N 1272 1202
Wald Chi2‐stat 6759.82 11148.89
AR(1) 4.43 4.51
AR(2) 0.83 0.12
Hansen test 113.93 117.96
Note: The dependent variable for models 1 and 2 isCash_TA, measured as the ratio of total cash and cash equivalents
to total assets. Cash_Tat–1 is the value of Cash_TA lagged one period. A_Vega is the average dollar change in
executive option portfolio for a 0.01 change in stock return standard deviation, among executive members of the
board measured in thousands. A_Delta is the average dollar change in executive wealth for a 1% change in stock
price, among executive member of the board measured in thousands. A_Gamma is the ﬁrst difference of A_Delta.
A_SalBon is the average cash salary compensation received by executive member of the board, measured in
thousands. Bsize is the natural logarithm of total directors on the board. Nex% is the ratio of total nonexecutive
directors on the board to total directors on the board. Firm_Risk is the annualized standard deviation of year t’s daily
stock return. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets.Mktbv is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the
book value of equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of total assets. Firm_Size is the natural
logarithm of total assets. Capex_Ta is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. RDSAG_Ta is the ratio of
research and development expenses to total assets. Although not reported, models 1 and 2 include a constant,
industry, and year effects. AR(1) and AR(2) are test statistics for ﬁrst‐ and second‐order autocorrelation in the
residuals, respectively, distributed as standard normalN (0, 1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test is a
test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi‐square under the null of instrument validity. The p‐values are
presented in parentheses.
Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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1, delta becomes insigniﬁcant as it did in model 1 of Table 3, further evidence of the
complementary relation between the two. Finally, the average executive cash
compensation has a signiﬁcant positive relation between cash holdings across all models
in Table 5 at the 1% level.
V. Conclusion
We used the parameters of the Black–Scholes option pricer and the results of Ross (2004)
with respect to the effects of option‐based convexity, magniﬁcation, and translation to
examine the relation between managerial compensation incentives and corporate decision
making. We show that the convexity and magniﬁcation effects reduce managerial risk
aversion, but these effects are diminished as delta increases. The implication is that the
alignment of managerial and shareholder interests that comes about through lower risk
aversion that induces managers to lower cash holdings in favor of riskier assets is reduced
by increases in delta.We also show that delta is a signiﬁcant determinant of the translation
effect. For utility functions with DARA its effect is negative. Its effect is positive with
IARA and neutral with CARA. Although vega does not appear directly as a determinant
of managerial risk aversion in the three effects outlined above, it can affect risk aversion
indirectly through its effect on managerial wealth. As with delta, the effect is negative
with DARA, positive with IARA, and equal to zero with CARA. The implication is that
the effect of delta and vega on cash holdings depends on whether the manager has DARA,
IARA, or CARA.
The empirical testing provides evidence that supports the model developed in
Section II. Our results show that there is a signiﬁcant positive relation between changes in
delta and cash holdings, which is evidence that changes in delta reduce the effects of
magniﬁcation and convexity on managerial risk aversion. We also provide evidence that
there is a signiﬁcant negative relation between the option delta and cash holdings. This
implies that UK managers generally exhibit DARA. This implication is reinforced by the
signiﬁcant negative relation between vega and cash holdings. Although vega is not a
direct determinant of risk aversion, the effect of the wealth‐increasing risk incentive
suggests that vega and cash holdings should be negatively correlated. Liu and Mauer
(2011), however, show that the relation between vega and cash holdings is much more
complicated than the simple wealth‐increasing risk incentive suggests, especially with
respect to debt ﬁnancing and liquidity covenants, and that in the United States this relation
is positive. Thus, besides the wealth‐increasing risk incentive, our ﬁnding of a negative
relation between vega and cash holdings could also reﬂect a lower incidence of debt
ﬁnancing and frequency of liquidity covenants due to the fact that UK credit markets are
less sophisticated than those in the United States.22 Finally, there is evidence that larger
cash compensation to managers heightens agency problems because of differing risk
preferences between managers and shareholders. As such, greater managerial cash
compensation encourages managers to engage in risk‐averse policies by increasing cash
22We thank an anonymous referee for this insight.
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holdings. These results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations, when incentives are
extended to include all executive board members and when the sample is broken down
according to different risk characteristics.
By taking into consideration the convexity, magniﬁcation, and translation effects,
this article offers insights into the whys and wherefores of the mixed results in the
literature cited above. Because the signs on vega and delta depend on whether the
managerial utility function is DARA, IARA, or CARA, the different signs and levels of
signiﬁcance in the samples could be due to different utility functions. For example, in one
sample DARA might predominate, resulting in a signiﬁcant negative relation between
vega and delta and risk aversion. In another it might be IARA that predominates, resulting
in a positive relation. Where CARA predominates there would be no signiﬁcant relation.
The different signiﬁcance levels could also be due to different mixtures of utility
functions. For example, DARA functions and IARA functions could have offsetting
effects, thereby reducing or eliminating statistical signiﬁcance. The mixed results could
also be due to an omitted variable problem. We have shown that the change in delta is a
key explanatory variable that affects the magnitude and signiﬁcance of vega and delta.
Because none of the previous studies includes this variable, it is safe to suppose that their
results have been affected.
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